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CIVIL COMMITMENT: RECOGNITION OF PATIENTS!
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974)
Plaintiff was involuntarily civilly committed to the Florida State Men-
tal Hospital in 1957.1 Before his release in 1971, he brought an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 alleging that five hospital and health officials
deprived him of adequate psychiatric treatment.3 A jury awarded com-
pensatory and punitive damages against two physicians,4 and they ap-
pealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed and held: A nondangerous involuntarily committed mental pa-
tient has a constitutional right to treatment.5
1. Kenneth Donaldson was committed by a county court judge of Pinellas County,
Florida, pursuant to Act of Aug. 1, 1955, ch. 29909, § 2, [1955] Fla. Laws 827 (now
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (Supp. 1974)). He was diagnosed as suffering from "para-
noid schizophrenia," which is
characterized primarily by the presence of persecutory or grandiose delusions,
often associated with hallucinations. Excessive religiosity is sometimes seen.
The patient's attitude is frequently hostile and aggressive, and his behavior
tends to be consistent with his delusions.
AMRIcAN PsYcmATmc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DIsoRDERs § 295.3 (2d ed. 1968).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction there-
of to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974) (No. 8). Donaldson had previously brought
fifteen unsuccessful petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the state and lower federal
courts in Florida. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 43
U.S.LW. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974) (No. 8). On four occasions, he had unsuccess-
fully petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 400
U.S. 869 (1970) (writ of certiorari); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 390 U.S. 971 (1968)
(writ of certiorari); Donaldson v. Florida, 371 U.S. 806 (1962) (habeas corpus); In
re Donaldson, 364 U.S. 808 (1960) (leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus).
4. The judgment was against two physicians who were hospital administrators and
Donaldson's attending physicians from 1957 to 1971. Compensatory damages were lev-
ied in the amounts of $17,000 and $11,500, and punitive damages were assessed at
$5,000 per doctor.
5. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 527 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974) (No. 8).
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Though statutory language varies,0 most states rely on two basic justi-
fications for permitting the involuntary commitment7 of the mentally
ill-8 First, for the benefit and protection of society, the state may act
under its police power to confine those found to be dangerous." Sec-
ondly, under the parens patriae doctrine, the state may choose to com-
mit a person for his own benefit.10 Inherent in both rationales is the
6. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally I1, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1190, 1203-04 (1974) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment]:
The primary differences among the present state standards for involuntary
commitment are contained in the statutory language setting forth the requisite
impact or consequences of the mental illness. Fifteen jurisdictions authorize
commitment only if the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or
others or is unable to care for his physical needs. Fourteen other states pro-
vide for commitment if the mentally ill person is dangerous or is in need of
care or treatment, with twelve of these requiring that the person in need lack
the capacity to make a responsible treatment decision. Seven states require
that commitment be necessary to protect the welfare of the individual or the
welfare of others, and fifteen others allow compulsory hospitalization based on
a mental illness which renders the individual in need of care and treatment or
a fit subject for hospitalization.
For a listing of the statutory language in the various states see id. at 1203-04 nn.11-
14.
7. See generally Bimbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Birnbaum]; Goodman, Right to Treatment: The Responsibility of
the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J 680 (1969); Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting
Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 755 (1969); Civil Commitment 1207-40.
8. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On Justifications for Civil Commitment,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 80 (1968):
Obviously, the definition of mental illness is left largely to the user and is
dependent upon the norms of adjustment that he employs. Usually the use
of the phrase "mental illness" effectively masks the actual norms being ap-
plied. And, because of the unavoidable ambiguous generalities in which the
American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic categories, the di-
agnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost
any person he wishes, for whatever reason, to put there.
9. Institutionalization under the police power concept is viewed as a form of pre-
ventive detention of the mentally il individual who is dangerous to society or to himself.
The current trend seems to be toward restricting the class of mental illnesses considered
dangerous and increasing the degree of probable harm needed to support a finding of
dangerousness. Civil Commitment 1205; see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1973). But see Ehagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.
2d 393, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
Although dangerousness is usually the standard for police power commitments, studies
reveal that mental illness is a poor indicator of future dangerous conduct. Comment,
Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate
Treatment, 86 HARV. L. Rv. 1282, 1289-90 n.43, 1295 (1973); see Bimbaum 767 (facts
do not support laymen's picture of the mentally ill as universally homicidal or suicidal).
10. Largely because of the uneasiness with the dangerousness standard, see note 9
supra, the therapeutic intent of involuntary commitment under parens patrlae has been
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nonpunitive nature of the confinement, the purpose being to "treat,"'1
"cure, ' ' 2 or "rehabilitate.' '13
Although recognition by the legal system of a right to treatment14
follows logically from the nonpenal motives underlying the commitment
statutes 5 and the deprivations of a committed individual's freedoms,' 6
the courts have refused to deal precisely with what is meant by "treat-
ment." '  Nevertheless, the states' purported purpose, to treat, is con-
increasingly emphasized. Katz, supra note 7, at 759. Parens patriae is translated as
"father of his country" and refers to the state's power of guardianship over persons with
disabilities. To commit a person under the rationale of parens patriae, recent cases
maintain that the individual must be shown to lack the capacity to make treatment de-
cisions. See, e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (ED. Wis. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1973).
11. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686, 687 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
12. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
13. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum).
14. Dr. Morton Birnbaum is usually credited as being the first to solicit the courts'
recognition of the right to treatment. As he originally conceived it, the concept was
to entail releasing all mental patients, dangerous or not, who were not receiving proper
medical treatment. The hope was that, if such a course were taken, new and adequate
treatment facilities would result from the public's awareness and concern. See Birn-
baum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Kittrie, Can thre Right to Treat-
ment Remedy the Ills of the Judicial Process?, 57 GEo. L.. 848, 866 (1969). Kittrie
contends that the right to treatment was alluded to in Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d
415 (D.C. Cir. 1953), and Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82
(1959). See also Birnbaum, supra note 7. The right to treatment has not been limited
to residents of mental institutions, but is also applicable to others involuntarily confined.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) (juvenile delinquents); Welsch
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) (mentally retarded).
15. "Hospitalization in this respect bears no relation to a jail sentence. A jail sen-
tence is punitive . . .. Hospitalization is remedial . . . ." Overholser v. Lynch, 288
F.2d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972);
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Millard v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 468, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala.
1971); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 611, 233
N.E.2d 908, 912-13 (1968); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 316-17, 159 N.E.2d
82, 85 (1959).
16. A committed person may not only be denied his liberty indefinitely, but may
also lose his rights to have custody of his children, to vote, to serve on a jury, to obtain
a driver's license, or to make a contract. Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at 1198-
99. After release, moreover, he may be socially ostracized and stigmatized like a con-
victed criminal. Id. at 1200; see In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
17. Statutes are seldom helpful in supplying a court with a useful definition. Many
provide only that treatment should be accorded to the extent of available facilities and
funds. Several states have patterned their commitment statutes on the Draft Act Gov-
erning Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill. See Civil Commitment 1319-21. Section 19
of the Act provides:
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sidered by the courts to be not just a desirable goal, but rather a duty
which must be fulfilled."' Relying at times on statutory require-
ments,' 9 but more frequently on the constitutional guarantees of due
process, 20 equal protection,21 and the prohibition against cruel and un-
Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment and, to the extent
that facilities, equipment, and personnel are available, to medical care and
treatment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical prac-
tice.
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 454, 461 (rev. ed. S, Brakel & R. Rock 1971),
reprinting NATIONAL INSTITuTE oF MENTA. HEALTH, FEDERAL SEcuRrY AoENCY, A
DRAFr AcT GovERNING HosprrALzATioN OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service
Pub. No. 51, 1952).
18. See cases cited note 15 supra.
19. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (recognized right to
treatment under 1964 Hospitalization of Mentally Il1 Act for District of Columbia).
But see Birnbaum 758 (contending that court in Rouse misconstrued statute and that
right to treatment should have been based on constitutional grounds).
20. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971):
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that con-
finement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate
treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process.
Accord, Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin,
364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteria
in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J 319 (1957); Com-
ment, supra note 9; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment,
77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967). Court decisions have also attacked procedural due process
violations in the commitment process. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1973). But see Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn.
1972), aff'd sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.
2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
21. Both old and new equal protection arguments have been made. See, e.g., Rouse
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 459 (1966) (dictum) (compelling reason is needed to justify
failure to provide adequate treatment); Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243
Md. 16, 41, 221 A.2d 397, 411, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966) (test to determine
validity of defective-delinquent statute was whether it was reasonably calculated to
achieve its legislative purpose). Commentators have also advocated that "strict scru-
tiny" should be the approach used in upholding the right to treatment. See Chambers,
Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitu-
tional Imperatives, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 1107, 1161-62 (1972); Comment, supra note 9,
at 1293-94. For other equal protection arguments see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Nason v. Superintendent of
Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968). See generally Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973);
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972).
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usual punishment,22 state and lower federal courts have upheld mental
patients' right to receive treatment while confined23 or, in the alter-
native, to be released.24
Establishing the statutory and/or constitutional foundation from
which the patient may assert his right to treatment is only the first step
toward vindicating a right 6 that has virtually escaped judicial inter-
pretation. The next step is to determine what treatment must be pro-
vided. In attempting to define treatment, however, most courts suc-
ceed only in modifying it with vague and nebulous adjectives, such as
"adequate," "appropriate," "suitable," or "proper." 26  Thus, despite
some general judicial pronouncements, 27 courts have failed to deal ex-
22. Most courts' reliance upon the eighth amendment stems from the decision in
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (making narcotics addiction a crime vio-
lates constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment since addiction is illness
or condition, and not an act). These cases find the provision of treatment necessary
to prevent an eighth amendment violation when confining persons with mental disabili-
ties. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) (mentally retarded);
Martarefla v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (juvenile delinquents); United
States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (incompetent to stand trial); cf.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th
Cir. 1973). See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 735 (1972) (dictum); Rouse
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dictum).
23. See, e.g., Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290
N.Y.S.2d 486 (CL Cl. 1968).
24. Some jurisdictions have also taken a least-restrictive-alternative approach. These
courts maintain that individuals must not be institutionalized if other equally effective,
but less restrictive, alternatives-such as outpatient community-based programs-might
be employed. Chambers, supra note 21; see Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Kesselbrenner v. Anony-
mous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973). But see State v. San-
chez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970).
25. Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at 1333 n.80.
26. "Adequate," as used in Donaldson, is the term most frequently used by courts
in describing the standard of treatment that state institutions are required to provide.
Many other adjectives, each as indefinite as "adequate," have also been used. See Mil-
lard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (suitable); In re Jones, 338 F.
Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972) (proper); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D.
Ala. 1971) (effective); Clatterbuck v. Harris, 295 F. Supp. 84, 86 (D.D.C. 1968) (ap-
propriate); In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 362, 88 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1967) (curative).
See also Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for
Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HAv. Civ. RrGTs-Civ. Lti. L. Rnv. 513,
519 (1973).
27. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), is illustrative of a decision
in which the court's espousal of the need for adequate treatment was undermined by its
use of ambiguous and vague language. Examples include "suitable treatment," "adequate
in light of present knowledge," "need not show treatment will cure . . . but only thatWashington University Open Scholarship
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plicitly with the issue of evaluating the adequacy of treatment.2"
there is a bona fide effort to do so," "measures which will have therapeutic value." Id.
at 456, 457. Given such nebulous guidelines, it is not surprising that, on remand, the
hearings concluded that the patient was receiving adequate treatment, in spite of expert
testimony that the therapy given the patient substantially deviated from professionally
accepted standards. See Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment, 10 AM. CraM. L.
REV. 587, 592 (1972). See also Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to
Treatment, 57 GEo. LJ. 782 (1969). The District of Columbia statute involved in
Rouse, however, was simdar to most other statutes in that its recognition of a right to
treatment did not include any mention of adequacy.
Decisions in other contexts have also failed to describe in clear terms the treatment
required. See, e.g., Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (juvenile
institutions); Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966) (institution for defective delinquents); People ex tel.
Chumley v. Mancusi, 26 App. Div. 2d 905, 274 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1966) (prisons). But
see Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (specific and detailed stand-
ards for mental hospitals were established on institution-wide basis).
28. A reason frequently given by courts for this failure is that setting guidelines in
this field is beyond the scope of the judiciary's knowledge. Perhaps the courts should
not be criticized too harshly for this attitude since they are confronted with "complex
and occasionally conflicting theories of psychiatry and the myriad treatments available
for mental illness . . . ." Civil Commitment 1335 (footnotes omitted).
There are three main points of view regarding the courts' function in cases concerning
mental illness and commitment. First, there is the attitude that regardless of the need
for medical appraisals of treatment, whenever deprivation of liberty is involved it is the
"law and not psychiatry [which] is the ultimate decision maker." Katz, supra note 7,
at 765. Advocates of this position believe the administrative model is the solution. Un-
der this approach, detailed findings and conclusions are not demanded of the judiciary;
rather, its task is to determine whether qualified experts have studied the situation com-
pletely and can defend their decisions and judgments, and the consequences thereof. See
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 742, 745 (1969):
No judge would claim the ability to prescribe a particular therapy for a
"chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic." But neither would any judge allocate
AM frequencies to avoid interference.
This position finds no practical difference between cases concerning mental illness and
other medical malpractice suits. See Halpern, supra note 27, at 798; Schwitzgebel, supra
note 26, at 516. Thus it is contended that psychiatrists' conduct should be measured
against the standards of the school of medical opinion to which they subscribe. See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTs § 32, at 163-64 (4th ed. 1971).
A second position held by some members of the legal community dictates a more self-
restrictive role for the courts, on the ground that psychiatry is a less developed specialty
and should be judged by less stringent standards than the rest of the medical profession.
Proponents of this position advise courts to be cautious when entering the field and sug-
gest that adequate treatment should be determined by independent administrative agen-
cies comprising psychiatrists and legal experts. See Kittrie, supra note 14, at 881; Note,
supra note 20, at 114. For criticisms of this position see Schwitzgebel, supra note 26,
at 516.
The third view is best expressed by the American Psychiatric Association in its Posi-
tion Statement on the Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. I. PsycmAT. 1458,
1458, 1460 (1967):
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In Donaldson v. O'Connor29 the Fifth Circuit became the first court
of appeals to acknowledge a constitutional right to treatment. In sup-
port of the derivation of this right from the due process clause,"° the
court offered a two-part theory: first, parens patriae patients must be
given treatment in order to avoid a violation of the due process prohibi-
tion of arbitrary exercise of governmental power;31 and secondly, the
state must extend a quid pro quo to justify confinement when an of-
The definition of treatment and the appraisal of its adequacy are matters for
medical determination. Final authority with respect to interpreting the law on
the subject rests with the courts. ...
It is one thing, however, for outside community agencies to render construc-
tive criticisms of the relative adequacy of a psychiatric facility and quite an-
other for it [sic] to interpose its judgments on the professional managerial af-
fairs of that facility.
Instead of offering the courts the assistance of the medical profession in framing proper
standards, advocates of this view rebuke the courts for "trespassing on the domain of
the psychiatrist" Halpern, supra note 27, at 802. This response of psychiatrists "has
been a major factor in frustrating the more rapid development of concepts of adequate
treatment." Id. at 803.
29. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 21,
1974) (No. 8).
30. Id. at 520. The court began "by noting the indisputable fact that civil commit-
ment entails a 'massive curtailment of liberty' in the constitutional sense." Id. Though
perhaps not totally incorrect, this supposition is at least an overstatement. As recog-
nized in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973):
What constitutes due process under any given set of circumstances must de-
pend upon the nature of the proceeding involved and the rights that may pos-
sibly be affected by that proceeding.
Id. at 762, citing Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
Given the different facts and reasons underlying each individual's commitment, it is at
least arguable that a "massive curtailment of liberty" does not occur when the purpose
is solely rehabilitative as in Donaldson. See Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 102
N.W.2d 870 (1960) (restraint for own welfare and protection is not loss of liberty
within meaning of due process clause). In contrast, Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972), from which the Donaldson court extracted the phrase "massive curtailment of
liberty," id. at 509, had a very different fact situation. Petitioner there was convicted
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, with a maximum sentence of one year,
but in lieu of imprisonment he was committed to a "sex deviate facility" in the state
prison for a potentially indefinite time.
31. 493 F.2d at 520-21. Since the first part of the court's theory was directed only
toward parens patriae patients, the three cases cited by the court are not very persuasive.
Two-Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), and Nason v. Superintendent of Bridge-
water State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968)-involved plaintiffs who had
been committed after being found incompetent to stand trial for a criminal offense.
Such cases fall under the police power, as well as the parens patriae, rationale. The
other cited source, Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), was a class
action, undoubtedly including parties not committed for reasons solely based on the
parens patriae rationale.Washington University Open Scholarship
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fense against the state has not been proved in a proceeding subject to
rigorous due process limitationsa 2
Although throughout the opinion "treatment" is used synonymously
with "adequate treatment, '3 3 the Donaldson court decided that a for-
mulation of standards for adequate treatment was not necessary to their
finding. Rejecting, however, the defense of nonjusticiability, 8 the
court cited Wyatt v. Stickney"5 as an example of a case in which a court
set detailed structural requirements for a state mental institution."
32. 493 F.2d at 521-25. The second part of the court's theory drew no distinction
between the parens patriae and police power rationales. The court cited numerous cases
concerned with various types of "nonpenal commitment"-such as juvenile delinquency
and mental retardation-and found a "near unanimous recognition" of the validity of
the quid pro quo argument. Id. at 524. For criticism of this theory, see Civil Commit-
ment 1325-26 n.39:
[The quid pro quo theory] implies that as long as procedural safeguards com-
mensurate with a criminal-type proceeding are accorded, there is no right to
treatment for police power patients. .. . Moreover, a state might turn the
quid pro quo argument around and assert that, since treatment is in fact being
provided, adequate procedural safeguards are not necessary.
33. 493 F.2d at 511: "Donaldson received no commonly accepted psychiatric treat-
ment." Id. at 521: "mhe due process clause requires that minimally adequate treat-
ment be in fact provided."
34. In arguing the nonjusticiability of the issue raised in Donaldson, defendants re-
lied principally on Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.
Ga. 1972). 493 F.2d at 525. The Burnham court bad found that the claim of a right
to treatment did not meet the test of justiciability set out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 198 (1962):
[W]hether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judi-
cially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judi-
cially molded.
The Burnham court had also quoted from Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
375 (1956):
The only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge
and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality
of judgment ....
35. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
36. The Wyatt court ordered compliance with proposed standards of adequate treat-
ment in mental hospitals. The court's standards were detailed and comprehensive, set-
ting minimum staff-patient ratios and requiring certain physical conveniences, such as
minimum amount of floor space per patient. See id. at 379-86. The Wyatt court's
method of evaluating treatment, called structural or institutional analysis, is the ap-
proach first advocated by Morton Birnbaum. See note 14 supra. Although it is perhaps
the easiest technique to use, it has been severely criticized, especially by proponents of
the individualized approach to creating standards. See Schwitzgebel, supra note 26;
Comment, supra note 9.
In 1969 the American Psychiatric Association revised its position and no longer speci-
fied minimum staff-patient ratios. See 126 AM. I. PsYCm&T. 879, 880-81 (1969). The
chairman of the task force explained the reasons for the change:
We were aware that some find such ratios useful in convincing trustees andhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/8
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This effort, however, to use Wyatt as evidence of the judiciary's ability
to set standards was undermined by the Donaldson courts failure to
use the structural analysis advocated in Wyatt.a7
The Fifth Circuit dismissed as inadequate the "milieu," "recrea-
tional," and "religious" therapies Donaldson had received, but the court
accepted, as proper forms of treatment, alternatives that defendants had
denied him-"occupational therapy," "grounds privileges," and "con-
sultations with psychiatrists. ' 38  In reaching these conclusions, the court
failed to recognize that medical studies have shown that the only effec-
tive means of treating Donaldson's diagnosed illness, schizophrenia,
have been drugs and electroconvulsive therapy, and this treatment was
refused by Donaldson.3" Thus, it is difficult to justify the courfs anal-
legislative committees of the need for larger budgets. Overriding this, how-
ever, was our view that patient-personnel ratios are meaningless as a general
standard. The type and purpose of the facility, the objectives and methods of
treatment, and the physical plant all influence the type and number of person-
nel required. Because of the infinite variety of facilities, the Task Force felt
that no meaningful patient-personnel ratios could be stated.
Id. See also Schwitzgebel, supra note 26, at 528-29 (study showed no clear relationship
between staff-patient ratio and success of released patients in community). Thus, the
Wyatt court's institutional standards "would merely give rise to a rebuttable presumption
that any given individual was receiving satisfactory treatment." Comment, supra note
9, at 1298.
37. The Donaldson court did not explore any aspect of the institutional standards
prescribed in Wyatt, see note 36 supra, even though it had an opportunity to do so since
the defendants relied upon insufficient resources as a defense. See note 42 infra and
accompanying text.
38. 493 F.2d at 511, 513-14.
39. Donaldson was a Christian Scientist and, for that reason, refused to submit to
the medication and electroshock forms of treatment. Although the involuntary commit-
ment of an individual confers upon hospital authorities certain powers to treat the person
against his will, there are limitations, one of which is religious belief. See Winters v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). Thus, Donaldson's
refusal to accept the somatic treatment may have been the primary factor accounting
for his long stay without significant improvement. See Feinsilver & Gunderson, Psycho-
therapy for Schizophrenics-Is it Indicated? A Review of the Relevant Literature, 6
SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 11, 20 (1972): "Thus these studies offer persuasive evidence that
drugs alone are the single most powerful and economical treatment for schizophrenic
patients. .. "
It is somewhat unclear what the court meant when stating, "the simplest and most
routine form of psychiatric treatment is to have a patient talk with a psychiatrist." 493
F.2d at 514. If psychoanalysis was being advocated, the court ignored the reality of
the medical situation. Psychoanalysis is in disrepute in the treatment of psychotic disor-
ders in most mental institutions in the United States. See Feinsilver & Gunderson, su-
pra; Greenblatt, Grosser & Wechsler, Differential Response of Hospitalized Depressed
Patients to Somatic Therapy, 120 AM. J. PSYcIZAT. 935 (1963); Huston & Lochner, In-
volutional Psychosis: Course When Untreated and When Treated with Electric Shock,
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ysis of the alternative therapies, since none of them was likely to have
as much success as the somatic treatment to which the patient would
not submit.
The court's acceptance of the jury's conclusion that defendants
"wantonly, maliciously, or oppressively blocked" an earlier release for
Donaldson40 amounted to recognition of the jury's freedom to accept
Donaldson's expert witnesses' opinions and to reject the conflicting
views of defendants, who also qualified as expert witnesses.4 Finally,
the court discounted the defendants' attempt to shift responsibility to
the state on account of the hospital's limited resources.42
59 Arcmmvs NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIAT. 385 (1948). For definitions and explanations of
the various types of therapy generally administered to mental patients, see Note, Condi-
tioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners
and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616 (1972). For further discussion of the mil-
ieu therapy see notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text.
40. 493 F.2d at 515.
41. Since the psychiatrists testifying for plaintiff did not know him while he was
institutionalized, much of the expert testimony was couched in terms such as "not 'con-
sistent' with a treatment plan for a patient with Donaldson's history," and "'standard
psychiatric practice'. . . [for] a patient of Donaldson's background, condition, and his-
tory." Id. at 513. Furthermore, the court admitted that the opinions of all three of
Donaldson's expert witnesses were based "upon the hospital records, Donaldson's psy-
chological reports, Donaldson's past history, and raw data from his psychological exami-
nations." Id. at 517. It seems ironic that reliance was placed on this testimony, while
the court criticized the defendants for failing to keep detailed and complete records. Id.
at 515.
42. Id. at 518; accord, Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
("[Tihe court is constrained to emphasize . . . that a failure by defendants to comply
with this decree cannot be justified by a lack of operating funds"); cf. Millard v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (failure to treat committed sexual
psychopath not justified by lack of staff or facilities); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506,
516-17 (4th Cir. 1964) (same concerning Maryland's defective-delinquent statute). See
also Bazelon, supra note 28, at 749:
Courts cannot force legislatures to provide adequate resources for treatment.
But neither should they play handmaiden to the social hypocrisy which ration-
alizes confinement by a false promise of treatment. Quite the contrary, courts
should and must reveal to society the reality that often festers behind the eu-
phemism of "hospitalization."
A lack of available funds, facilities, and the manpower needed to run the hospitals has
placed the courts in a dilemma in the enforcement of their decisions. Promulgating the
right to treatment is not enough if funds are not appropriated by the legislatures to allow
its proper implementation.
This irmpasse raises still another enforcement issue that legal commentators are debat-
ing: What is the best method for the individual mental patient to pursue in order to
obtain relief? The alternatives are (1) a suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as in Donaldson, see note 2 supra; (2) habeas corpus relief, see, e.g., Coving-
ton v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); (3) monetary damages for false imprisonment; (4) mandamus to require
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/8
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The most serious weakness in the court's decision was its insufficient
rebuttal of the defendants' contention that the claim was nonjustici-
able."3 The first time in the opinion that a line was drawn between
treatment per se and adequate treatment was the court's declaration:
"There will be cases-and the case at bar is one-where it will be pos-
sible to make determination whether a given individual has been de-
nied his right to treatment without formulating in the abstract what con-
stitutes 'adequate' treatment." 44  Although extreme cases of neglect
may arise, in which a court's result will require no express formulation
of standards for adequacy of treatment, Donaldson was not such a case.
The evidence before the court focused on a dispute between psychia-
trists' judgments as to the therapy that should have been administered,
and on the patient's refusal to submit to the only therapy likely to be
successful. Such a situation cannot be easily dismissed as a clear case
of general neglect of treatment.45  By the very nature of its factual cir-
treatment; or (5) tort damages. There are a number of drawbacks to the first three
strategies. Mental patients may be more likely than others to be unaware of their rights
and have little access to legal assistance. Suits may be long, and there is always the
possibility of harsh treatment of litigious patients by the staff. Comment, supra note
9, at 1304-05.
Problems also confront the patient seeking injunctive relief. Formulating as specific
a decree as would be needed may require considerable expertise on the part of the court.
Also, the court's inability to enforce the injunction if the legislature decides that other
priorities are more deserving of limited funds may deter the court from issuing the in-
junction. See Civil Commitment 1338 n.96; Comment, supra note 9, at 1305.
There are two sharply conflicting views on the efficacy of individual tort actions.
Schwitzgebel, supra note 26, at 530, asserts:
[C]ourts can fashion decrees in monetary terms and thereby eliminate the
need for direct judicial intervention in the management of treatment institu-
tions while still having a coercive, budgetary effect.
See Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (court relied
on elements of negligence and malpractice to give $300,000 judgment). In opposition
to tort actions, Morton Birnbaum argues that litigation may extend over a period of
many years and may result in an antitherapeutic relationship between the staff and pa-
tient. He also notes the lack of success of medical malpractice suits in achieving im-
proved care and believes that severely mentally ill persons often do not make satisfactory
clients. Birnbaum, supra note 7, at 756-57 n.20.
43. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
44. 493 F.2d at 526. The court continued: "Neither judgment required any a pri-
ori determination of what constitutes or would have constituted adequate treatment, and
of course no such determination was made." Id.
45. See Note, supra note 20, at 109-10 (emphasis added; footnote omitted):
[Blut what if the doctors testify at length that a patient is receiving recrea-
tional therapy and is living in a therapeutic milieu which is reforming his shat-
tered ego? Judge Bazelon seems to feel that standards or categories can be
developed to label milieu therapy adequate for certain types of disorders and
797
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cumstances, the Donaldson case demanded a judicial criterion for eval-
uating adequacy of treatment.
In spite of its statements to the contrary, the Donaldson court was
implicitly using some basis to distinguish adequate from inadequate
treatment.46  In fact, by attempting to make value judgments regarding
the various forms of treatment, the Fifth Circuit may have assumed a
larger role than it is qualified to perform. Illustrative is the court's
characterization of milieu therapy as
nothing more than keeping Donaldson in a sheltered hospital 'milieu'
with other mental patients ....
. . . In short, he received only the kind of subsistence level custodial
care he would have received in a prison .... 47
Though there may be some controversy over the efficacy of the milieu
form of treatment, it is nevertheless recognized by many psychiatrists
as beneficial to some patients.48  Thus, the court's analysis reflects what
not for others, but difficulties are apparent. There will be a significant diver-
gence of expert opinion on the questions of appropriateness and effectiveness,
and undoubtedly much reluctance on the part of psychiatrists to confine and
narrow the applicability of the various modes of treatment. There are no easy
standards, except in the grossest cases of neglect.
46. Although unarticulated, the basis of the court's standard of adequacy of treat-
ment seems to be the "effectiveness" of the treatment. 493 F.2d at 514: "Once again,
there was evidence to show that the situation improved when Donaldson was transferred
to Dr. Hanenson's care." Id. at 526: "[T]he jury properly could have concluded that
Donaldson had been denied his rights simply by comparing the treatment he received
while he was under Gumanis's and O'Connor's care with that he received while under
Hanenson's care. . . ." The court's implication, simply stated, is that since Donaldson
was sufficiently cured to be released within a short time after Dr. Hanenson became
his doctor, and since the treatment he had received for the previous ten years from de-
fendants had not cured him, the latter's care must have been inadequate. The primary
difficulty with assessing adequacy in terms of results is that improvement of a patient
is not always a reliable index of whether he is being treated. See Note, supra note 20,
at 107. It has been demonstrated, in fact, that for some disorders there is a spontaneous
remission rate as high as twenty percent without any treatment, whereas other patients
may not recover regardless of the treatment attempted. See id. at 107 n.81. Another
defect in using effectiveness to measure treatment is that "dischargeability" and "treat-
ability" are apt to be confused. See Birnbaum, supra note 14. See also Postel, Civil
Commitment: A Functional Analysis, 38 BRooKLYN L. REv. 1, 42 (1971); Comment,
supra note 9, at 1287-88.
47. 493 F.2d at 511-12.
48. American Psychiatric Association, supra note 28, at 1460:
All parts of the environment surrounding a patient have impact on him. The
total effect of his overall milieu cannot be explained by analyzing each part
of it separately. In one hospital ward setting all decisions must be made for
him-when he will shave and shower, when and what he will look at on tele-
vision, etc. In another ward situation general permissiveness may characterizehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/8
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is actually at stake between the differing attitudes toward the judiciary's
role "in inducing change . . .when legislatures and executives have
failed to act." '49
Despite the shortcomings in the Donaldson court's reasoning, the re-
sult reached is likely to be viewed favorably as a progressive step to-
ward achieving better care for the mentally ill.10 Nevertheless, the
court's refusal to make an express determination of what constitutes ad-
equate treatment, in conjunction with a misplaced reliance on Wyatt,
may set an unsatisfactory precedent.51 Merely to award damages for
"inadequate" treatment of an involuntarily civilly committed mental pa-
tient is not enough; the establishment of practical standards, easily em-
ployed in the determination of adequacy, is essential if relief is to
be provided to all deserving patients without unduly restricting the insti-
tutions' and physicians' efforts to treat the mentally ill.52
the milieu. Either situation may have a therapeutic or antitherapeutic effect
on the disease process.
Note, supra note 39, at 621 (milieu therapy is "the scientific manipulation of the envi-
ronment aimed at producing changes in the personality of the patient"). See also Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, supra note 28, at 1459:
[I]t is unsound to dismiss a procedure as "purely custodiar' or "purely punish-
ing" without assessing the total circumstances on which it has been prescribed.
The procedure is often of therapeutic value. A program that has therapeutic
value for one patient may be of no benefit to another. Some patients, for ex-
ample, manifest acute anxiety when placed in open wards; others panic when
placed behind locked doors.
49. Kittrie, supra note 14, at 876; see note 28 supra.
50. Cf. note 14 supra.
51. For instance, a court in a subsequent case may follow Donaldson's directions,
apply the Wyatt institutional analysis, and find (as did the Donaldson court) no need
to go further than a simple declaration that the treatment is or is not adequate. An
anomalous result may occur if a hospital meets the structural standards for adequate
treatment set out in Wyatt, but a patient is not receiving treatment adequate to his needs.
52. As indicated in note 46 supra, "effectiveness" or "improvement" alone should
not be the standard for determining adequacy of treatment. Nevertheless, the absence
of improvement may be the starting point for creating a test for adequate treatment.
One possible test would be the following: If the records of a patient show no improve-
ment (improvement would have to be measurable, probably in respect to current medical
knowledge, with the key being the time of release), if there is no sufficient explanation
for the lack of improvement, and if alternative methods of treatment have not been
tried, then the treatment should be considered inadequate. In contrast, even though im-
provement appears to be lacking or is minimal, if the records indicate alternative treat-
ments have been legitimately utilized and different physicians have been in attendance
periodically, then the treatment received should be deemed adequate. In addition, it
may be feasible to require a more rapid turnover of a patient's attending physicians if
the patient does not respond favorably to the treatment provided. Such a procedure
would not only give the patient a broader exposure to the varying opinions of different
psychiatrists and the different schools of thought prevalent in psychiatry, but would also
eliminate the likelihood of psychiatrists' being found to have "wantonly and maliciously"
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denied patients adequate treatment merely because the patients have been under their
care for a long time without improvement.
If the court implemented such a test, mental hospitals might be motivated to initiate
better periodic-review programs to discover the validity of a patient's continued confine-
ment. And, as a consequence, fewer determinations of adequacy of treatment might be
required of the legal system. For a discussion of current review procedures, see Civil
Commitment 1378.
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